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Portraits of Luis Villoro
Guillermo Hurtado
TRANSLATED BY KIM DÍAZ
FIRST PORTRAIT: THE HACIENDA
San Luis Potosí, México. A tall slim boy walks with his mother 
across the central square of an hacienda. The boy is just 
getting used to the geography and people from that place. 
Born in Barcelona, the son of a family who emigrated due to 
the Mexican Revolution, and who had been living in Europe 
for most of their lives. The mother and son come close to a 
group of peasants who wait for them with their hats in their 
hands and their heads tilted downwards. Villoro tells us:
All of them greeted me with great devotion 
because I was el patroncito, I was the son of their 
landlord. One of these Indians came to me with 
great reverence, took my hand and kissed it, this 
left a terrible impression on me, that this old man 
who was doing the hardest type of work in the 
fields and heat of the sun would come to me—a kid 
who had nothing to do with him, and respectfully 
kiss my hand. For me, this was at the same time an 
experience I felt to be deeply insulting, and which 
also made me feel an incredible amount of respect 
the cajones—to reject their Americanization and boldly 
claim their Mexicanness.
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has always insisted that not just anything can pass for 
philosophy, and much less for good philosophy. Genuine 
philosophy, according to him, should be the rigorous 
exercise of an autonomous reason, and above everything 
else, of reason in the service of life.
SECOND PORTRAIT: MASCARONES
The photograph taken by a street artist captures him 
walking by the Ribera de San Cosme in the company of 
Emilio Uranga and Ricardo Guerra. All three of them are 
very young, dressed up in suits and ties, and carrying books 
under their arms. They are smiling, and it is evident that they 
are enjoying the conversation between them. I imagine all 
three of them entering the tall doorway of the house built in 
the eighteenth century known as Mascarones, and walking 
into the yard of the Philosophy Department. There they stop 
to say hello to their fellow students, but promptly walk into 
the seminar room. The students take their seats and await 
the arrival of their teacher; José Gaos makes his entrance, 
places his books on the desk, takes a breath, and begins 
speaking. The students observe a concentrated silence. This 
is not an ordinary class, nor a teacher like any other. Villoro 
has mentioned that the only teacher he acknowledges 
as such is Gaos. It is impossible to understand Mexican 
philosophy in the twentieth century without the teachings 
of Gaos, the philosopher transterrado. His students were, 
besides Villoro, Leopoldo Zea, Emilio Uranga, Fernando 
Salmerón, Alejandro Rossi, to mention only the most 
prominent among them. Villoro belonged to the generation 
of Gaos’s students who called themselves El Hiperión, and 
who had their moment of major activity between 1948 
and 1952. This group proposed themselves two ambitious 
goals: on one hand, to philosophize in a strictly professional 
manner, with the highest level of originality and rigor; and 
on the other hand, to philosophize from and about their 
surrounding reality, to philosophize about México, about 
Latin America, not as another academic interest, but rather 
with the goal of transforming this reality, of shaking this 
reality up, of liberating it. Villoro’s large philosophical work 
is a testament to the strict fulfillment of both ideals—the 
criterion by which Mexican philosophy has been judged in 
the twentieth century. What distinguishes Villoro from the 
other Mexican philosophers of this period is that he has 
demonstrated more than anyone else that both ideals are 
not only compatible, but also complimentary. Unfortunately, 
this lesson has not been thoroughly learned and must 
be repeated. Villoro’s message to Latinamericanists is 
that an engaged and liberating philosophy must also be 
professional and rigorous, and to analytic philosophers, 
his message is that a clear and rigorous philosophy which 
does not attempt to reflect autonomously, nor attempt to 
search for the relevance with its own reality, will be nothing 
more than a borrowed philosophy. This is how Villoro wrote 
about this in an exchange he had with Leopoldo Zea:
By “rigorous philosophy” one should not 
understand an academic type of philosophy, 
informed by the latest publications in English 
or German. It also does not mean an aseptic 
philosophy in the face of the motivating reality 
that the philosopher lives. Rigorous philosophy 
simply means a philosophy that with the exercise 
of proper reason, attempts to take to the logical 
for this person, this old man. This experience 
stayed with me throughout my life (I think my 
book) Los Grandes Momentos del Indigenismo en 
México (. . .) is due largely to the experience I had 
that day.1
Villoro is referring to his first book, published in 1950, when 
he was twenty-eight years old. The subject of Mexican 
Indians, however, has preoccupied him throughout his life. 
And I say that it has preoccupied him and not merely been 
of interest to him because for him, this has to do with a 
problem that touches the most profound fibers of his being. 
Villoro does not lose sleep over the Indian as an abstract 
concept, but as a concrete human being. Villoro has 
extended this concern towards all those who suffer some 
type of exclusion, in other words, some type of injustice. 
The exercise of reason, and especially that of philosophical 
reason, has always been for Villoro the exercise of a life-
giving type of reason. Villoro’s more theoretical and 
abstract works have ultimately been preoccupied with 
the existential, the moral, and the political, in the best 
sense of this tarnished word. We could say that Villoro has 
always believed in the liberating power of reason. This is 
why he has sought to offer us a philosophical vision of 
reason—without falling into skepticism or nihilism—that 
is worthy of mankind. This is how we should understand, 
I believe, the original theory of knowledge that he 
offered in Creer, saber y conocer. When he proposed his 
revisionist definition of knowledge, and did away with 
the requirement of truth, what he meant to do was to 
articulate a concept of knowledge that would allow us to 
better understand the epistemic practice in its historical 
dimension, but above all else, to better understand the 
epistemic practice in relation to its political practice. This 
is why there is such a close relationship between Creer, 
saber y conocer, which was published in 1982, and El Poder 
y el valor, published in 1997. The epistemic ethics of the 
first book leads to the political ethics of the second book; 
the epistemic communitarianism of the first book leads to 
the political communitarianism of the second book. Within 
the philosophical work of Luis Villoro, which spans over six 
decades, one can observe an extraordinary continuity of 
what has preoccupied and motivated him. One could say 
that the principal themes of his work have been as follows: 
the metaphysical understanding of otherness, the limits 
and reach of reason, the connection between knowledge 
and power, the search for community with others, the 
ethical reflection of injustice, the advocacy of respect 
towards cultural differences, and the critical dimension of 
philosophical thought. To develop these themes, Villoro 
has traveled an enormous philosophical territory. The 
list of authors over whom he has written with authority 
is long: Machiavelli, Descartes, Rousseau, Marx, Dilthey, 
Husserl, Marcel, Wittgenstein, Rawls, et cetera. Villoro 
traveled promptly through the main philosophical currents 
of the twentieth century: existentialism, phenomenology, 
Marxism, analytic philosophy. He passed through all of 
these without stopping too long in any one of them, 
without falling into the subsidiary fervor of so many of our 
colleagues. We could say that in all of these years, Villoro 
has cultivated a balanced philosophical pluralism. For him, 
not one philosophy should be taken as the True philosophy; 
none should be turned into dogma. Nevertheless, he 
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Philosophy is the disruptive activity of reason, 
and we can find reason at the limit of all scientific 
thought. Philosophy is not a profession; it is a form 
of thought. The type of thought that laboriously 
attempts again and again to conceive without ever 
actually achieving, that which is different, that 
which is removed from any society that claims to 
have a hold on reason. That which is different, that 
we never quite achieve, which is always sought 
through wonder and perplexity, is truthfulness in 
the face of prejudice, illusion, or lies, authenticity 
in the face of alienation, freedom in the face of 
oppression.3
I look at Villoro’s photograph reading his discourse. It is the 
image of a mature man, firm, in full capacity of his faculties, 
master of an enormous intellectual and moral prestige. This 
is a man who, had he wished to, could have taken leadership 
of the Secretaría de Educación Pública or any other position 
of this magnitude. If he did not, this was due to the loyalty 
he felt towards philosophy, understood not as the placid 
life led by the university professor or petite bourgeoisie 
researcher, but as a permanent criticism of political power. 
Not only of the government’s power in its functions and of 
the economic groups allied with it, but also of that smaller 
but not any less vicious political power that is exercised 
among the opposing parties and intellectual circles. Even 
though Villoro is a man of declared leftist politics, he has 
never defended any type of orthodoxy, not any type of 
leadership, as many of his other comrades have done. This 
is because for Luis Villoro, being a leftist does not mean one 
adopts a particular ideology; instead, it means to assume 
a moral posture that consists in adopting a disrupting 
attitude in the face of any oppressive power. This attitude 
is tied to an epistemic position that could be qualified as an 
anti-dogmatic fallibilism, and an understanding of reason 
as a type of dialogical plurality. This is why Villoro has stood 
up against the leftist ideologies and utopias that have been 
used to tyrannize people and exterminate dissidents. Villoro 
has never been a card-carrying member of any political 
party, in the sense that Ortega meant, but he has always 
been the type of man who is engaged with what he believes 
to be the best causes. Villoro formed part of a renowned 
group of intellectuals who, in the decades of the fifties 
and sixties, sought to restore the Mexican political system 
from its extremes. As already mentioned, his involvement 
in the student movement of 1968 was pivotal, and he has 
supported the political campaigns of various leftist parties. 
Outside of the country, his important role in UNESCO 
should also be remembered. But the relationship that he 
has had with the political movement that emerged in 1994 
with the Indigenous uprising in Chiapas is unparalleled. 
Villoro believes that the neo-zapatistas have traversed a 
hopeful route to political reform without committing the 
mistakes of traditional leftist movements. The democracy 
that Villoro has in mind is a direct democracy, deliberative, 
exercised among small communities—towns, work unions, 
neighborhoods—in which the assembly takes decisions 
by consensus, and in which the structures of domination 
and exclusion have been dismantled, or as the Mexican 
Indians say, “se manda obedeciendo,” one commands by 
serving. It seems to me that two political currents dovetail 
in Villoro’s thought that ultimately respond to two very 
conclusion, the examination of received opinions 
and doctrines. A philosophy that does not stop at 
vague rationalizations or rhetorical figures, and 
which does not take borrowed opinions postulated 
by others without submitting them to questions. 
Rigorous philosophy is reflection that aspires to 
be clear, precise, and radical. In this sense, all 
rigorous philosophy is liberating, but its liberating 
work does not consist in postulating action or 
political indoctrination, but rather in questioning 
the received beliefs...2
Villoro has been one of the main proponents of professional 
and engaged philosophy in our countries. He founded 
the journal Crítica in 1967 along with Alejandro Rossi and 
Fernando Salmerón. Crítica sought to be a space for the 
new directions of Iberoamerican philosophy. The acclaimed 
philosophy from the journal was a clear philosophy, rigorous, 
of good technical stripe, close to the sciences, and without 
folklorist inclinations, nor Weltanschauung pretentions. In 
1974, Villoro founded the Humanities and Social Sciences 
division of the Iztapalapa branch of the Universidad 
Autónoma Metropolitana. This was an academic experiment 
where philosophy was integrated with other disciplines. For 
the faculty constitution of the new department, Villoro hired 
analytic as well as Marxist philosophers. This speaks once 
again to his philosophical pluralism; but not so much to the 
pluralism of others, given that it did not take too long for 
the analytic and Marxist philosophers to begin quarreling. 
In any case, it is very revealing that many philosophers 
of all philosophical currents proudly declare themselves 
to be Villoro’s students. And since Villoro has cultivated 
with the same type of quality other disciplines such as 
intellectual history, cultural theory, and political criticism, 
his significance has spilled over the narrow boundaries of 
academic philosophy. The Mexican historians, sociologists, 
and anthropologists who consider Villoro’s work to have 
been inspiring and illuminating are not few. Those who had 
the good fortune to have attended his classes agree that 
he is the type of teacher who combines the qualities of 
the rigorous philosopher with those of the accomplished 
orator. Villoro has taken on the most difficult philosophical 
problems both in and out of the classroom with the qualities 
of clarity, intelligence, and passion that are so characteristic 
of him. These qualities manifest themselves in his writings. 
Villoro’s philosophical prose is—let us emphasize this—a 
model of how to write philosophy in Spanish.
THIRD PORTRAIT: EL COLEGIO NACIONAL
El Colegio Nacional occupies the building of the old 
Convento y Colegio de la Enseñanza in the center of Mexico 
City. Since its founding in 1943, el Colegio only had space 
for twenty members, but in 1972, President Luis Echeverría 
doubled this number. Rumor had it that the expansion of 
el Colegio was Echeverría’s strategy to coopt intellectuals 
who had distanced themselves from his regime after the 
massacre of 1968. No one, however, could have suggested 
this explanation when Villoro arrived in el Colegio on 
November 14, 1978. His incoming presentation infamously 
titled “Philosophy and Domination” is one of the strongest 
defenses of the critical role that philosophers ought to 
adopt in the face of political power. I cite the last words of 
this magnificent discourse. Villoro tells us:
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with other people, who are also I’s, is not only the source 
of morals, but also the source of our lives. In some way, 
Villoro had already discerned this antinomy in one of his 
first writings, “Solitude and Communion,” published in 
1949. There, Villoro tells us:
Love moves us to appropriate another, but, at 
the same time, it demands that the other remain 
independent; for if for one moment the other 
stopped being unyielding, the loving engagement 
would disappear; it would no longer be two 
different beings face to face, but only one in 
solitude. Similarly, the subject desires to give 
himself completely but, nevertheless, love is only 
sustained by what remains original of him in the 
face of the other, by what remains of his intact 
safeguard, by what remains of his intimacy: that 
which remains in solitude is only maintained by 
communion. And it is this way, that the fullest 
communion has latent in its bosom the most 
profound solitude.5
If the “I” is an illusion, then so is love; but it seems that 
Villoro’s heart refuses to accept such cold conclusion. At 
this point, a comparison with Octavio Paz may be revealing. 
Paz, influenced also by Asian thought, affirmed that the ‘I’ 
is a shadow of the personal pronoun, but he also refused 
to accept that love is a mere illusion. The comparison with 
Paz—in spite of all of their differences—may help us to 
emphasize a common characteristic of the thinkers of that 
generation, and this is that even though they were forever 
disillusioned with the utopias of modernity, they continued 
thinking that a rationality that is more modest and sensible 
towards the intimate fibers of life could mark a change for 
humanity in these dreary times.
FIFTH PORTRAIT: ESCUELAS PÍAS
Madrid, October 1st, 2007. In the site that the Escuelas Pías 
de San Fernando used to occupy, which today is a modern 
university center, Villoro listens to a tribute about his life 
and work. Suddenly the speaker is silent. He will have 
many more things to say, many more, but he hopes that his 
respectful silence will also be significant.
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deep aspects of his personality. On one hand, we can find 
a liberalism that confronts any and all types of oppressive 
authority, and on the other hand, a communitarianism that 
attempts to dissolve the egoism of the individual person. 
The possible tensions between these two currents are 
very well known by us: On one extreme the hegemonic 
power of the community has the potential to suffocate the 
individual person, and on the other extreme, the defense 
of individual rights puts a limit to communal sovereignty. 
Villoro’s political philosophy attempts to bring together 
these two currents, although I am not sure how successful 
he has been. In any case, one ought to emphasize that he 
has sought a synthesis in order to overcome these tensions.
FOURTH PORTRAIT: LA MEZQUITA AZUL
The blue mosque has six narrow minarets and a cascade of 
domes and semi-domes that make it look even taller than 
it is. Luis Villoro scans the interior, illuminated by dozens of 
blue glass windows and hundreds of small lamps that hang 
from the roof. Around him is a multitude of prostrated men 
who recite their prayers. Villoro admires the building like 
any other tourist; even so, a deep emotion overtakes him. 
Something bigger than him compels him to kneel down. He 
narrates the experience he had that moment:
I am aware that I am one of many, small, insignificant 
in the ocean of worshipping humanity (...). My voice 
gets lost among the voices of all the other men. 
It is the entirety of humanity that every so often 
crosses over to that other space of full otherness. 
But my vanity is still present. I am aware of myself 
and register my words. I realize I’m thinking about 
what I will do, maybe, write about this moment. So 
I pray: “Please remove my pride, let my immense 
pride be destroyed, have my egoism be erased 
once and for all. And only at that moment did I 
feel, only then I saw truthfully. Everything had 
forever turned transparent, everything was pure, 
(...) everything is well. The ‘I’ had been lost, small, 
trivial, forgotten. How amazing! Let this be, then! 
Let the all be all, let the all be one!4
But when the experience ended, when Villoro’s ‘I’ returned 
to take its place in the world, what Villoro feared when he 
dissolved in the chorus of prayers, took place. Villoro not 
only narrated his experience, but he also teased it apart with 
a brilliant ruthless analysis. The essay, titled “La Mezquita 
Azul,” was published in 1985. In this and other writings, 
Villoro has formulated to himself the questions of what the 
divine may be, how we may come to know it and speak 
about it, and what consequences one’s experience of the 
divine may have for our lives. Villoro does not believe in 
a personal God, but he does believe that mankind lives 
facing what is an absolute Other. Of this otherness, one 
cannot speak, but one may offer a meaningful silence. This 
philosophical place of Villoro’s is nourished by sources 
as diverse as the Upanishads, Buddha, Eckhart, Otto, 
and Wittgenstein. For Villoro, the encounter with radical 
otherness demonstrates to us that in the end, the ‘I’ is only 
an illusion and this is a good thing. But it seems to me that 
here is another tension in Villoro’s thought. On one hand, 
he complains about the ‘I’, of any ‘I’, his and that of others, 
but on the other hand, he believes that the vital encounter 
